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 Abstract 
 
We estimate the benefits of geographic diversification within states and across states for bank 
risk and return for all U.S. bank holding companies over 1994 to 2008, and assess whether 
such benefits depend on bank size.For small banks, only intrastate diversification increases 
risk-adjusted returns and reduces default risk while for very large institutions only interstate 
expansions are beneficial but only in terms of default risk. In all cases the relationship ishump-
shaped indicating that at some point, the possible agency costs associated with banks getting 
wider and more geographically diversified outweigh the benefits.Our results indicate that 
small banks and very large banks could still benefit from further geographic diversification.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has made U.S. banks not just larger, but also 
wider. The largest bank holding companies (BHCs) now operate across multiple states and 
smaller ones now do business across multiple markets and counties within states. Compared to 
the vast literature on growing size and scale, this wideningand the potential geographic 
diversification it provides hasbeen relatively neglected.
1
We document trends in geographic 
diversification for BHCs and investigate how such diversification affects their risk and return 
while controlling for scale .  
While scale and width are obviously related, scale is a production concept while 
diversification is a portfolio concept. Accordingly, we imagine banks as a portfolio of loans 
and we treat improved opportunities to diversify geographically, due to deregulation for 
example, as an upward shift in the risk-return tradeoff facing a bank. Importantly,an 
improvement in that return tradeoff does notnecessarily lead to lower risk; depending on their 
preferences, some banks may respond to the improved returns to risk-taking by increasing risk, 
albeit with greater returns (Demsetz and Strahan 1997). How risk varies with improved 
diversification opportunities depends on a bank’s appetite for risk, but in any case, risk-
adjusted returns (e.g. the Sharpe (1994) ratio) should increase with diversification, all else 
equal.Any gains from diversification may diminish, or even become costs, if agency conflicts 
between BHC headquarters and branch management increase sufficiently with the distance 
between them (Berger and DeYoung (2001), Deng and Elyasiani (2008), Goetz et al. (2013)). 
We allow for that possibility byestimating a general, quadratic relationship between our 
measures of geographic diversification, on the one hand, and various performance measures 
on the other.  
Like Deng and Elyasiani (2008) and Goetz (2012), we measure geographic 
diversification using the FDIC’s annual Summary of Deposits, wherein banks annually report 
the amount of their deposits at all their U.S. branches.Deposit diversification is of course only 
a proxy for loan diversification, but given the abundance of evidence that small business and 
                                                          
1
 As a somewhat crude measure of that neglect:  A Google Scholar search of the phrase ―economies of scale in 
banking‖ yields  817 hits while a search for ―geographic diversification in banking‖ yields 111 hits. Without the 
quotes, the respective tally is 1.2 million vs. 71 thousand. 
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consumer lending, and to a lesser extent mortgage lending, are still very local (Peterson and 
Rajan (2002),Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)) we maintain that is a reasonable proxy.We 
measure diversification across states (interstate diversification) and across MSAs 
(Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and rural counties within states (intrastate) over 1994-
2006.
2
Looking within BHCs, we estimate how geographic diversification relates to various 
measures of risk, returns, and risk-adjusted returns while controlling for a host of other 
variables, including diversification across loan types and income sources. 
We find that for small banks, only intrastate diversification is beneficial both in terms 
of risk-adjusted returns and default risk.For very large institutions only interstate 
expansionsarerewardingbut only in terms of default risk. However, in all cases the relationship 
ishump-shaped for both intrastate and interstate diversification indicating limits for banks of 
all size. Our results indicate that both small banks and very large bank could still benefit from 
further geographic diversification. 
Our findings contribute to the recent research on geographic diversification in 
banking.Deng and Elyasiani (2008) study 505, large publically traded, U.S. banks and find 
that greater geographic diversification is associated with increased market value and reduced 
risk. Goetz et al., (2013) also focus on publically traded banks but do not look at risk. While 
these studies are limited to public BHCs with book value of assets averaging more than 10 
billion of dollars, our paper coversessentially all U.S. banks—public and private. Extending 
the analysis to include smaller private banks is useful because shareholders of public banks 
can diversify by holding shares in banks all over the country but smaller, private banks may 
need to physically spread their operations across the state or across the country to diversify. If 
the owners of such small banks have a large portion of their wealth invested in the bank they 
will not be able to hold enough shares in other banks. Other studies look at the effect on risk 
for small banks located in one state (Goetz, 2012) or small community banks (Emmons et al., 
2004) but do not investigate the impact of geographic diversification on small banks’ risk-
return tradeoff. By considering the broadest possible sample of banks, our aim is to investigate 
the potential benefits of diversification at various size levels and multiple geographic 
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 We start in 1994 to capture the diversification trends following the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act of 1994. 
We end in 2006 to avoid disruptions brought on by the global financial crisis. For further insights, we also 
separately consider the 2007-2008 period.   
  4 
dimensions encompassing the case of a small bank initially operating in a single county or 
MSA and reaching for new business only a few miles away to the largest institutions spreading 
across states and internationally.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2relates our work to 
previous literature and discusses our research focus. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 
our empiricalmodeland results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.   Related literature  
 
The widening of U.S. banks and the accompanying geographic diversification has been 
a gradual process over decades. Starting in the 1970s, as individual states began letting banks 
branch across their own state, and compacts of states began allowing interstate bank mergers 
among the states in the compact. In 1982, BHCs were allowed (by the Garn-St. Germain Act) 
to buy failedbanks in any state, regardless of state laws. Before 1994, virtually all mergers 
involved two banks in the same state, often a healthy bank buying a failing one. The Interstate 
Banking Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) enables BHCs to buy any bank—healthy or not—in any 
state.  
Riegle-Neal essentially made interstate banking a bank right rather than a state right and 
hastened the widening and diversification of U.S banks.
3
This process was accomplished in 
large part through mergers, both within state and across states. As noted earlier, the potential 
efficiency gains associated with greater scale via mergers has been studied at great length.
4
 
Our focusis on the other dimension of scale-width- and the possible diversification benefits 
arising from it.  Although our analysis accounts for mergers, we do not study the merger 
process itself.  
                                                          
3
 See Strahan (2003) for a thorough review of the deregulation driving intrastate branching and interstate banking. 
4
 DeYoung et al. (2009) review 150 studies after 2000 on bank mergers gains. In general, the early findings 
suggested that gains for U.S. banks were quite limited.Dietsch and Oung (2001) draw a similar conclusion from 
their study of bank mergers in France: "… market-driven merger strategies based on cost synergies do not seem 
to be empirically justified.  On the other hand, there seems to be an underused potential for income synergies and 
risk diversification gains."  More recent research for U.S. banks, do find evidence of economies of scale, even for 
very large banks (Wheelock and Wilson2012).  
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With their focus on scale, researchers have largely ignored the potential geographic 
diversification benefits of consolidation in the banking industry.This disinterest may be partly 
theory based; investors can hold shares in large, public banks all over the country, so they may 
not need banks to diversify themselves. Shareholders may even penalize diversification at the 
firm level if it reduces pressures on managers to perform well. The diversification ―discount‖ 
for non-financial firms (where the whole firm is worth less than its parts) suggests that 
investors prefer focused firms where managers stick to their core business. Laeven and Levine 
(2007) find a diversification discount in the banking industry, indicating that economies of 
scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium and to outweigh the costs 
associated to agency problems. Of course, diversification is a core business in bankingso it 
seems plausible to expect some upside for better diversified banks. Diversification may also 
improve banks’ investment by smoothing internal cash flows through internal capital markets 
thereby avoidinghigher external funding costs (Houston, James, and Marcus 1997).
5
 
Geographic diversification may also create costs (Goetz et al. 2013). When opening 
branches in a new county or state, banks face learning costs due to the lack of information on 
this new market. These costs can be particularly high for banks which specialize in 
relationship lending such as community banks. As banks geographically expand, collecting 
soft information becomes more costly as the distance between the lender and the borrower 
increases and the transmission of this information across the different management layers 
becomes more difficult. Moreover, getting wider puts distance between principals (executives 
and owners) and agents (management) and hence wider banks may face higher agency costs. 
Costs associated with geographic diversification could hence be different for banks with 
different business models. As discussed in Stein (2002), lending technologies based on soft 
information will face decreasing returns to scale but lending technologies relying on hard 
information can be more easily scaled up. 
Though neglected, researchers have not ignored geographic diversification entirely. In 
their study of listed BHCs, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) findthat the largest BHCs were more 
diversified across census regions, and that such diversification was associated with lower stock 
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 With the advent of diversified asset backed securities (ABS) a bank may be able to diversify geographically 
without physically spreading out across space.  Of course there are still many important asset classes (small 
business loans, personal loans, installment loans, etc.) that are not securitized, but to the extent ABS obviates 
physical geographic diversification, we will tend to find no effect. 
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return volatility. Among Italian banks, Acharya et al (2006) find that geographic 
diversification improves the risk return tradeoff, at least for relatively safe banks. Assessing 
the effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency with a sample of 7000 banks from 
1993 to 1998, Berger and DeYoung (2001) find mixed results; expansion to nearby states or 
regions tends to increase bank efficiency, but inefficiencies tend to increase with the distance 
between a bank holding company’s headquarters and its subsidiaries, possibly due to 
increasing agency costs. 
The negative impact of distance on the diversification discount is also reported by 
Deng and Elyasiani (2008) in terms of higher diversification discount and higher risk. Using a 
sample of 505listed BHCs, they analyze the link between geographic diversification and BHC 
value and risk by focusing on the distance between headquarters and branches. While 
increased geographic diversification enhances bank value and reduces risk, larger distance 
generates a diversification discount and higher risk. Hence, the diseconomies associated with 
distance may limit the gains from geographic diversification.Goetz et al. (2013) also find a 
negative relationship between geographic diversity, following interstate bank deregulation, 
and BHC value. According to the authors, this result could reflect agency costs; larger 
diversity makes it more difficult for outside investors to control insiders which allows them to 
extract larger private benefits from the bank. Nevertheless, by further exploring the potential 
benefits of technological progress in the banking industry, Berger and DeYoung (2006) 
highlight how these changes have facilitated the geographic expansion of U.S. banks by 
reducing distance-related agency costs and by improving the control of parent banks on their 
subsidiaries. Benefits of geographic diversification could also result from higher competition 
in local banking markets. As highlighted by Evanoff and Ors (2008), geographic deregulation 
in the U.S. had a positive effect on bank efficiency. By increasing competition in local 
markets, entry of new competitors, through mergers and acquisitions, leads incumbent banks, 
not involved in the process, to reduce their costs and hence improve their cost efficiency. 
Moreover, bank diversification could also affect the risk-taking behavior of local non-
diversified competitors. Indeed, Goetz (2012) highlight that bank diversification tends to 
increase bank risk-taking but lowers competitors' risk-taking. 
  7 
Although portfolio theory would predictthat geographically concentrated banks would 
be riskier than geographically diversified banks, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence on the 
vulnerability of U.S. banks'to local economic shocks. Meyer and Yeager (2001) do not find a 
significant link between bank performance and local economic conditions. Moreover, focusing 
on community banks located in a single county, Yeager (2004) does not find local economic 
shocks (which are independent from state or nationwide economic conditions)to 
systematically impair bank performance.If banks are not actually affected by local economic 
shocks, the potential benefits of geographic diversification, particularly for community banks 
may be questioned. Using a technique ofsimulating mergers, Emmons et al. (2004) investigate 
the ability of small community banks (i.e. with a total assets less than $400 million USD) to 
reduce default risk through scale effects and geographic diversification. The authors 
concludethat benefits of geographic diversification for small community banks are small. As 
idiosyncratic risk dominates local market risk in small community banks, they could reduce 
failure risk through increasing size, by acquiring other banks in the same market they 
operate.However, for small community banks located in urban markets, benefits of geographic 
diversification are greater, reflecting higher heterogeneity in economic conditions across U.S. 
urban areas than rural areas. Our question iswhether greater geographic diversification is been 
associated with higher risk-adjusted returns and lowerdefault risk.We expect a positive 
relationship between diversification and risk-adjusted returns up to a point, after which the 
potential costs (agency, learning, etc.)could outweigh the benefits and cause a negative 
relationship between risk-adjusted returns and diversification.Moreover, whether risk 
increases or decreases with diversification will depend on the risk strategies pursued by 
diversifying banks. If they switch towards riskier strategies their default risk could increase 
even if their risk-adjusted returns are higher.    
 
3. Data  
3.1 Data and sample  
Our data are from Bank Call Reports and FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SOD). The 
initialsample comprises BHCs and banks are not affiliated with a BHC leading to an 
unbalanced panel of 10,681 banks with a total of 92,550 annual observations. In our main 
  8 
investigation we use data from1994 to 2006,starting with the Interstate Banking Act of 1994 
(Riegle-Neal) and ending before the global financial crisis triggered in 2007 to avoid atypical 
disruptions. We also conduct estimations during the peak of the crisis by separately 
considering the 2007-2008 period.
6
We measure all variables at the holding-company level, i.e. 
we treat all banks affiliated with a holding company as a single entity.
7
 Measuring at the bank 
level instead would ignore the diversification provided via affiliation with banks in other 
locations. We exclude credit card banks, wholesale banks, or other special purpose entities. 
Diversification may matter for such institutions, but because they do not operate deposit 
networks, deposit data are not a good proxy for their geographic diversification.
8
We exclude 
banks that have not filed Call Reports for at least five years. To account for bank mergers and 
acquisitions, we follow Stiroh and Rumble (2006) andidentify banks whose total assets have 
grown by more than 30% between any two consecutive yearsexcluding three-year windows 
around the merger because we use the time dimension to compute some of our risk measures.  
 
3.2 Diversification measures and trends 
We measure geographic diversification using an inverse concentration measure of 
deposits across each banks’ branches. Specifically, geographic diversification for bank iin year 
tequals:
9
 
 
GDit= 1 - j (Depositsj /Total Deposits)
2
 
  
                                                          
6
As noted by an anonymous referee, investigating the post-crisis period would have been very 
instructive. Unfortunately, because our risk and risk-adjusted return variables require historical 
data for computation (rolling-window standard deviations) we are limited by the time 
dimension of the data available post-crisis.
7
We aggregate data for commercial banks that are affiliated 
with the same holding company into BHC-level measures for each ―market‖. For commercial banks that arethe 
holding company (i.e., the only commercial bank affiliate), the BHC and bank data are the same.  
7
We aggregate data for commercial banks that are affiliated with the same holding company into BHC-level 
measures for each ―market‖. For commercial banks that arethe holding company (i.e., the only commercial bank 
affiliate), the BHC and bank data are the same.  
8
 We identify wholesale banks using Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data that identifies whether an 
institution is considered a wholesale bank for CRA assessment purposes. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) and CRA data are calendar year data. Here we also use year-end BHC data. Since the Summary of 
Deposits (SOD) data are reported for June of each year, we merger adjust these data to reflect the year-end bank 
and BHC-affiliates status before constructing our geographic diversification indices.   
9
Unless otherwise noted, we use ―bank‖ and ―BHC‖ interchangeably. 
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Where Depositsjequals deposits of bank i in location j at time t and Total Deposits equals total 
deposits of bank i at time t.GDvaries between 0 (a bank with all its deposits in a single branch) 
to one (a bank with its deposits spread widely (infinitely) across many branches. The branch 
deposit data are from the annual Summary of Deposits collected by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  
We measure geographic diversification at both the ―local‖ and state level. 
GD1measures diversification across 2600 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSAs)and all non-
MSA counties. This intrastate measure corresponds to the ―local market‖ concept used in 
antitrust analysis and the literature on market structure and performance.GD2measures 
interstate diversification across the 50 states. 
Insert Table 1 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal that the average U.S. bank has indeed become widersince 
1994. The mean of GD1 (intrastate diversification)almost doubled between 1994 and 2006: 
from 0.104 to 0.190. GD2 (interstate diversification) also increased, although less 
substantially. While diversification has increased, most banks remain highly undiversified: in 
2006, more than 50 percent of banks still operated in a single county and more than 75 percent 
in a single state. 
 To disentangle the effect of geographic diversification and size within relatively 
homogenous bank subsets, we assess the effect of geographic diversification using three sub-
samplesof banks stratified by size (assets). Following the literature,we define ―small banks‖as 
those with assets of $1 billion or less, ―large banks,‖with total assets above $1 billion and 
below $10 billion, and ―very largebanks‖with total assets of $10 billion or more.  
 
 3.3Bank profitability and risk measures 
 
To measure bank profitability, we use the return on assets (ROAit) and the return on 
equity (ROEit): 
ROAit = 
Net incomeit
Total assetsit
 
  10 
ROEit =
Net incomeit
Total equityit
 
 
 To measure bank risk-takingwe use the standard deviation of the return on assets, 
(SdROAit)and the standard deviation of the return on equity, (SdROEit) computed on a rolling 
window of 3 years.10For robustness, we also use an alternative measure which captures the 
quality of the loan portfolio: the ratio of net loan and lease chargeoffs to total loans 
(CRED_RISKit ).  
We measure risk-adjusted returnsusing the ratio of ROAitto its standard deviation 
SdROAit, RaROAit and the ratio of ROEitto its standard deviation SdROEit, RaROEit:  
 
RaROAit=
ROAit
SdROAit
 
RaROEit=
ROEit
SdROEit
 
 
 
 
We also consider bank default risk using a 3-year rolling Z-score defined as:    
Zit =  
ROAit       + EQUITYit            
SdROAit
 
 
where EQUITY is the ratio of total equity to total assets and ROA       and EQUITY           are backward 
moving averages of ROA and EQUITY over a 3-year rolling window. The Z-score indicates 
the number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to fall below its expected value 
before equity is depleted. Thus, a higher value of Z is associated with a lower default 
probability. 
 In our regressions, we exclude observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 percentile of 
our bank profitability, risk-adjusted returns and bank risk measures to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. We end up with a panel of 6,532 banks and a total of 65,381bank-year observations. 
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The rolling windows cover the current and two previous years.  
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3.4Control variables 
CONTROLitincludes a number of control variables. First, bank-specific variablesare 
included to account fordifferences in portfolio diversification and functional diversification. 
Two product diversification indexes (LOANit and FOREIGNit) and one functional 
diversification index (INCOMEit) are computed. Diversification indexes across the major loan 
categories (LOANit), across foreignand domestic loans (FOREIGNit), and across interest and 
non-interest income sources (INCOMEit) for each bankare measured analogously: 
 
LOANit= 1 - 
j
j=1-6 (Loansj /Total loans)
2
 
 
FOREIGNit= 1 – ((Foreign loans/Total loans)
2 
+ (Domestic loans/Total loans)
2
) 
 
INCOMEit=   1 – ((Non-interest income/Income)
2 
+ (Interest income/Income)
2
) 
 
Loan diversification (LOANit) is measured across the six major loan categories 
(Loansj) reported in the Call Reports.
11
 The non-interest activities measured by 
INCOMEitinclude any fee-generating activities by banks(as opposed to interest), e.g. 
underwriting, payment services, trading activities, etc. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that a 
higher share of non-interest income in total income is associated with higher volatility of bank 
returns. In principle, foreign diversification (FOREIGNit) should operate on risk and return in 
the same way as domestic diversification across the U.S. We also include liquidity risk 
LIQUID_RISKit, (Core deposits/Total assets), leverage, EQUITYit, (Total equity/Total 
assets)in the estimations. 
We include dummy variables for main bank loan specialization (agricultural loan, 
mortgage specialists, consumer-oriented, etc.) and to distinguish some specific types of banks 
(banks which are part of a holding company from independent banks and agricultural lending 
institutions). We also take into account the specific characteristics of our sample regarding 
geographic diversification/concentration. Because more than half of the banks in our sample 
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Commercial and industrial, commercial real estate, home mortgages, consumer, agricultural, and other. 
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operate in a single county and more than 90% are located in a single state, we include in our 
estimations two dummy variables which take the value of 1 if the bank is located in a single 
county (SINGLECOUNTY)
12
or a single state(SINGLESTATE) respectively. We also include 
time effects but while these time effects are constant across banks but could differ across 
states, we also control for state-level specific effects. We use annual information on county-
level unemployment rates and compute an indicator of 'within-state' economic disparities, 
(SDUNEMPst). This variable is the dispersion of unemployment rates across the counties of a 
given state sat time t.   
Tables 2.1 to 2.4provide statistics for the full sample and three sub-samples. 
 
Insert Tables 2.1 to 2.4 
 
Not surprisingly, the extent of geographic diversification varies substantiallyby 
banksize. Over 50% of small banks operate in only asingle county and more than 90% operate 
in a single state.  By contrast,more than half of large banks and nearly all very large banks 
operate in multiple states. 
Table 3reports descriptive statistics for diversified and non-diversified banks. 
Diversified banks tend to be larger and more profitable. Their loan portfolio is also more 
diversified and they are involved in a broader set of business lines. Moreover, diversified 
banks exhibit higher risk-adjusted returns but also higher levels of default risk. Such 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Insert Table 3 
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 We do not include this variable in the estimations on the sub-sample of very large banks as they are all located 
in more than one county. 
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Given the high correlation between geographic diversification and size, to avoidco-
linearity,we orthogonalizethe logarithm of total assets against each GD measure and use the 
residuals as our size proxy (SIZE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Econometric model and results 
 
4.1 Econometric model 
Our baseline model is as follows: 
Yit =∝i+∝T+ β1GDit + β2GDit
2 + θ1SIZEit +  δCONTROLit + εit                               (1) 
 
 Yitmeasureseither bank returns (ROA or ROE) or risk (Z-score or standard deviation of 
returns). αi and αT are respectively the individual/bank effects  and time-specific effects.GDitis 
one of the two measures of geographic diversification of bank i at time t (GD1itor GD2it). 
SIZEitequals the log of assets of bank i at time t,orthogonalized with respect to the 
diversification measures. 
 The quadratic specification allows for U (or humped) shaped relationships between 
geographic diversification and the dependent variables; we expect diversification to increase 
risk-adjusted returns up to some point,beyond whichit could have negative effects due to 
distance-related information and agency costs. Moreover, differences in size and business 
model could also affect geographic diversification benefits. Lending technologies which rely 
on soft information may be harder to extend to new locations than those based on hard 
information.Hence, when expanding beyond their core market, small banks and more 
specifically community banks specialized in relationship lending may face higher costs than 
larger banks which rely on transaction-based lending technologies. 
 We measure the impact of increased diversification on each outcomeusing the marginal 
effect evaluated at the mean of GD (GD    ): 
  14 
∂Y it
∂GD it
= β1 + 2β2GD      (2) 
The decision to expand across counties or across states might be partly endogenous; 
better performing banks might be more likely to expand or more risk averse bank owners 
might be more inclined to diversify geographically.To avoid bias, we estimate equation (1) 
using the instrumental variables. For both diversification measures the instruments include two 
lagged values of the measures themselves and their squared values. For the intrastate 
diversification (GD1)we also use the number of years since a state first remove its intrastate 
branching restrictions. For interstate diversification (GD2), we use the number of years since a 
state first began liberalizing its interstate banking laws. Starting with Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1998), the deregulation dates have been widely used in the banking literature to identify how 
exogenous changes in banking structure and competition affect both bank and economic 
performance. For example, Goetz (2012) uses the intrastate deregulation dates in studying how 
diversification induced by regulatory changes affects bank outcome and market structure. 
 
4.2Results 
 Results for the full sample of banks are reported in Table 5. 13 For intrastate 
diversification (first panel), both GD and GD squared enter significantly in every regression 
except for SdROA.  The opposing pattern of coefficients implies a hump-shaped relationship 
between geographic diversification and ROA, risk-adjusted ROA and ROE, and LogZ. That 
hump shape suggests that diversifying geographically across MSA and counties within a state 
initially increases returns and reduces default risk default but that beyond some point is 
associated with reduced returns and higher default risk. Although the relationships are hump-
shaped, the marginal effects of on GD on ROA, RaROA, RaROE, and Z-scores are positive 
and significant, implying that for a bank at the average level of diversification across a state, 
spreading into another MSA or ruralcounty would increase returns and lower default risk. The 
point estimates imply a sizable impact; a standard deviationincrease in GD1increases RaROE 
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The first stage regressions (available upon request) indicate a positive and significant effect of deregulation on 
both intrastate and interstate expansion. Kleibergen-Paap tests and Hansen J-statistic indicate that our instruments 
are valid.  For brevity, we only report results for ROA and SdROA. Results for ROE and SdROE are similar 
(available upon request).   
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by 8.8 percent and reduces default risk (i.e. increases logZ) by 3.6, with both effects measured 
relative to average.
14
 
The results for interstate diversification (GD2) are in the right panel. RaROA and 
SdROA are not significantly related to GD2, but ROA and RaROE are both significantly 
related to GD2 in the same hump-shaped pattern as for GD1. The marginal effect of GD2 on 
both variables is positive, implying a gain in returns for the average bank in diversifying to 
another state. By contrast with GD1, GD2 is monotonically and positively related to LogZ.  
Overall, the results full sample are consistent with our expectations. We find benefits 
from intrastate and interstate geographic diversification on ROA, risk-adjusted ROA, and 
default risk up to a point, after which the agency costs, leaning costs, or other downsides 
associated with distance turns those benefits into costs. Nevertheless, the average bank would 
gain in both return and risk reduction from a marginal increase in diversification.   
The results for the subsample of banks (small, large, and very and large) are in Table 
6.We find intrastate and interstate geographic diversification to have a different effect on risk-
adjustedreturn and bank risk according to bank size. Firstly, we find a hump-shaped 
relationship between intrastate diversification and both profitability and risk-adjustedreturn for 
small banks. We further find a non-linear effect of intrastate expansion on default risk.A one 
standard increase in intrastate diversification (0.215) leads to an increase in risk-adjusted 
return (RaROE) of 1.81 and a decrease of default risk (logZ) of 0.20 where the mean of risk-
adjusted return and of default risk are 9.61 and 4.36 respectively. At low levels of 
diversification the impact on default risk is negative but such benefits are limited when 
diversification is stronger. However, we do not find any significant effect of interstate 
diversification. These results are consistent with the U.S banking industry consolidation 
process which occurred during the second part of the 1990s. As pointed out by DeYoung and 
Hunter (2003), and Emmons et al., (2004), the bulk of mergers are ―mini-mergers‖ which 
involved small/community banks, in most cases located nearby. As these new markets are 
nearby their own local market, small banks do not face sharp increases in monitoring and 
learning costs. Such an expansion allows them to reduce their idiosyncratic risk and to 
improve their risk/return tradeoff. At the other extreme, for very large banks (i.e. with total 
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 A one standard deviation increase in GD1 is associated with an increase of 2.08 in RaROA, or 20 percent 
compare to its mean.  
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assets above $10 billion) we find a significant impact of interstate diversification on bank 
default riskbut again the relationship is hump-shaped indicating that such benefits are limited.  
However, while this effect is statistically significant, the economic significance remains 
relatively low. A one standard increase in interstate diversification (0.275) lead a decrease of 
very large banks default risk of 0.07. However, we do not find any significant effect for large 
banks (those with total assets ranging from $1 billion to $10 billion). 
The marginal effect of intrastate diversification on risk-adjusted return is positive and 
significant for small banks, indicating that intrastate expansion is still beneficial for small 
banks. Moreover, our results show that further interstate expansion might allow very large 
banks to reduce their default risk. We also highlight the other sources of diversification to 
have different effects on risk-adjusted returns and risk according to bank size. While income 
diversification reduces risk-adjusted returns and increases risk (both earnings volatility and 
default risk) for small banks, it reduces risk for very large banks. For very large banks, default 
risk is also negatively associated with diversification across loan categories.
15
 
Our results clearly reveal a non-linearimpact of geographic diversification. Whereas at 
one extreme, intrastate geographic expansion positively affects small banks’ risk-
adjustedreturn and reduces their risk, at the other extreme, interstate diversification allows 
very large banks to reduce their default risk. But, in between, geographic diversification does 
not appear to be beneficial.Such limits in the benefits of geographic diversification for larger 
banks are consistent with the findingsof Deng and Elyasiani (2008) who highlight a reduction 
in BHC value and an increase in bank risk with higher distance between headquarter and 
branches. Similar conclusions are highlighted by Goetz et al. (2013) who show thathigher 
geographic diversification due to interstate deregulation is associated with a reduction in BHC 
value.  
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For the sub-samples of small and large banks, test statistics mostly conclude to the validity and the strength of 
our set of instruments. For large banks, in three cases, the results of the weak identification test indicates a 
reduction in the strength of instrumentation. As estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak, we re-
estimate equation (1) using the limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator which is more robust 
to weak instruments. Results are qualitatively similar and do not highlight any significant effect of geographic 
expansion for large banks. For the subsample of very large banks, our instruments are valid and strong (weak IV 
and over identification tests) regarding interstate diversification but to a lesser extent for intrastate diversification. 
We therefore also use the LIML estimator and find qualitatively similar results. 
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4.3Further issues and robustness checks 
After the 2008 financial crisis the Federal Reserve has distinguished very large and 
systemically important institutions from other large banks with a threshold of $50 billion 
(FED, 2011). We hence also consider a sub-sample of systemic banks (total assets of $50 
billion and above). We run IV regressions for this sub-sample and do not find any significant 
impact of both intrastate and interstate diversification. As systemic banks have already reached 
a high level of both intrastate and interstate diversification, further expansion within the U.S. 
might not be beneficial anymore. To investigate the possible influence played by the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, we conduct estimations for the 2007-2008
16
. All in all, the 
results indicate that the benefits of diversification are apparently weaker during this troubled 
period. The results of the regressions on the whole sample of banks (small and large) no longer 
show any significant impact of geographic diversification on risk-adjusted return (Table A1). 
Nevertheless, intrastate diversification still affects default risk but interstate diversification no 
longer matters.  A closer investigation using the different size sub-samples shows that small 
banks no longer benefit from diversification in terms of risk-adjusted return although their 
default risk is still reduced, although at the 10% level only (Table A2). Because of data 
limitations, the estimations could not be carried out for the very large and systemic banks. 
The intrastate diversification measure treats all rural counties separately, even if they are 
adjacent. That may overstate the risk mitigating effects of diversification if the covariance of 
economic activity across adjacent rural countiesis high. Accordingly, we estimated the model 
using alternative measure of intrastate diversification that counts individual MSAs separately, 
but treats non-MSA counties as a single entity, yielding 380 entities in total. While we still do 
not find any significant effect of intrastate diversification for both large banks and very large 
banks, small banks benefit from diversification across MSA counties (Tables A3 and A4).  
Our initial sample includes BHCs and non-BHC commercial banks. Excluding the latter 
does not change our main findings (Tables A5 and A6). 
 As an alternative risk measure, we use the ratio of net charges off of loans and leases to 
total loans (CRED_RISK). Thisvariable captures the quality of the loan portfolio of the bank. 
We find a hump-shaped relationship between intrastate diversification and credit risk for small 
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Due to data limitations, we perform these estimations using the OLS estimator. 
  18 
banks. The initial steps toward diversification, decreases the quality of bank’s portfolio while 
further expansion tend to attenuate this effect.This might be explained by a geographic 
diversification behavior which have led small banks to first expand in nearby contiguous 
regions, characterized by a strong correlation in economic activity. As highlighted by Berger 
et al. (1999), DeYoung and Hunter, 2003 and Berger et al. 2004, the bulk of mergers which 
occurred during the second part of the 1990s are ―mini-mergers‖ which involved 
small/community banks, in most cases located nearby (Emmons et al., 2004). Therefore, 
moving forward their core markets do not allow small banks to fully benefit from the access to 
these new markets and to reduce their risk. Further expansions in non-contiguous markets with 
non-synchronized economic conditionsmay allow small banks to benefit from disparities in 
economicconditions and hence increase their loan portfolio quality.The overall effect of credit 
risk is positive and significant. A one standard deviation of intrastate diversification leads to 
an increase of small banks’ credit risk of 0.0007.Mean credit risk is 0.003, so the magnitude is 
small (Table A7). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper contributes to the literature on bank diversification by focusing on the benefits 
of geographic diversification. Since 1994, U.S. banks have strongly expanded their activities 
across counties and across states. Our findings clearly highlight some benefits from being 
presentin more counties within the same state as well as across states. We use detailed data 
spanning the period 1994, when the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act was introduced, to 
2006, prior to the global financial crisis and also separately investigate the two years of the 
peak of the crisis (2007-2008). We consider bank geographic diversification from the extreme 
case of institutions with operations limited to a single location (individual Metropolitan 
Statistical area (MSA) or individual county) to the case where customers are reached 
nationwide. While (either intrastate or interstate) geographic diversification is, on the whole, 
beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted return, the effects are non-linear and depend on bank size. 
While at low levels of diversification spreading across counties or across states improves 
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banks’ risk-adjusted return, this positive effect turns out to be negative when geographic 
diversification moves further up. Moreover, whatever its scope, geographic expansion 
significantly reduces bank risk. Our results indicate that, on average,small banks (i.e. with 
total assets below $1 billion) have still not reached their optimal diversification level. But 
small banks can only gain from diversification within their state In between, medium size or 
large banks (i.e. with total assets between $1 billion and $ 10 billion) will not benefit from 
further diversification.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics on Intrastate (GD1) and Interstate (GD2) Diversification of U.S. banks1 
 
1994-2006 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.138 0.232 0 0.978 0 0 0 0.245 0.500 0.852 
GD2 0.013 0.076 0 0.918 0 0 0 0 0 0.481 
N 65381          
1994  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.104 0.211 0 0.955 0 0 0 0 0.477 0.823 
GD2 0.009 0.064 0 0.856 0 0 0 0 0 0.438 
N 5074          
2006 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.190 0.261 0 0.962 0 0 0 0.405 0.610 0.876 
GD2 0.023 0.098 0 0.916 0 0 0 0 0 0.551 
N 4248          
1GD1 measures diversification across MSAs and non- MSA counties.  GD2 measures diversification across states. pi: ith percentile. 
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Figure 1: Intrastate diversification (1994 - 2006)
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Figure 2: Interstate diversification (1994 - 2006)
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Table 2.1Descriptive statistics - Whole sample1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Bank-level variables 
ROA 0.011 0.005 -0.011 0.028 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.017 
ROE 0.115 0.049 -0.039 0.265 0.055 0.082 0.113 0.146 0.181 
SdROA 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.016 0.0004 0.0007 0.001 0.002 0.004 
SdROE 0.020 0.018 0.001 0.127 0.004 0.007 0.01 0.025 0.043 
RaROA 10.11 7.355 0.894 34.62 2.654 4.590 7.977 13.70 21.13 
RaROE 9.713 6.711 1.143 31.16 2.769 4.594 7.865 13.13 19.99 
Z 121.8 127.0 5.320 923.1 25.43 44.18 80.75 148.2 264.2 
LogZ 4.367 1.014 -2.999 10.26 3.150 3.743 4.366 4.995 5.608 
GD1 0.138 0.232 0 0.978 0 0 0 0.245 0.500 
GD2 0.013 0.075 0 0.918 0 0 0 0 0 
INCOME 0.249 0.091 0 0.500 0.137 0.185 0.242 0.307 0.372 
FOREIGN 0.0008 0.016 0 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.691 0.109 0 1.000 0.549 0.654 0.722 0.763 0.789 
EQUITY 0.105 0.035 -0.015 0.767 0.073 0.082 0.096 0.117 0.147 
LIQUID_RISK 0.737 0.093 0.002 0.979 0.620 0.688 0.751 0.802 0.839 
log(TA) 11.38 1.252 6.957 20.38 9.964 10.56 11.27 12.03 12.85 
State level macroeconomic variable 
SDUNEMP 1.879 1.191 0 9.157 0.771 1.096 1.624 2.403 3.287 
N = 65381 n = 6532         
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-
year window standard deviation of ROA ; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
logZ: log of Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification 
index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets;Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets(TA); N: number of observations; n: number of 
banks; pi: ithpercentile.SDUNEMP: Standard deviation of unemployment rates across the counties of a given state s at time t.  
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics –Small banks (Total Assets ≤$1 billion)1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.011 0.005 -0.011 0.028 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.017 
ROE 0.114 0.049 -0.039 0.265 0.0548 0.081 0.111 0.144 0.179 
SdROA 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.016 0.0004 0.0008 0.001 0.002 0.004 
SdROE 0.020 0.018 0.001 0.127 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.025 0.043 
RaROA 10.00 7.309 0.894 34.62 2.622 4.541 7.870 13.53 20.90 
RaROE 9.609 6.658 1.143 31.16 2.744 4.546 7.772 12.96 19.75 
Z 121.0 126.6 5.320 923.1 25.28 43.81 80.11 147.2 262.5 
LogZ 4.361 1.011 -2.999 10.26 3.147 3.738 4.359 4.989 5.601 
GD1 0.124 0.215 0 0.917 0 0 0 0.204 0.491 
GD2 0.007 0.051 0 0.686 0 0 0 0 0 
INCOME 0.245 0.088 0 0.500 0.136 0.183 0.239 0.302 0.364 
FOREIGN 0.0004 0.012 0 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.690 0.109 0 1.000 0.546 0.653 0.721 0.762 0.789 
EQUITY 0.105 0.035 -0.015 0.767 0.074 0.083 0.096 0.118 0.148 
LIQUID_RISK 0.741 0.088 0.003 0.979 0.628 0.692 0.753 0.803 0.840 
log(TA) 11.24 1.016 6.957 13.81 9.945 10.53 11.22 11.92 12.61 
N = 62999 n = 6370         
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-
year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
logZ: log of Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification 
index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of 
banks; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics – Large banks ($1Billion <Total assets <$10Billion)1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.012 0.004 -0.009 0.027 0.008 0.010 0.0125 0.014 0.017 
ROE 0.143 0.043 -0.039 0.265 0.091 0.117 0.142 0.171 0.198 
SdROA 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.016 0.0003 0.0005 0.0009 0.0017 0.003 
SdROE 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.127 0.004 0.006 0.012 0.020 0.034 
RaROA 12.99 8.018 0.895 34.27 4.019 6.680 11.25 18.10 25.37 
RaROE 12.46 7.422 1.146 31.08 3.910 6.559 10.88 17.32 23.64 
Z 145.7 137.6 6.182 921.3 34.01 56.84 100.4 184.6 321.4 
LogZ 4.510 1.066 -0.037 8.315 3.237 3.875 4.536 5.166 5.789 
GD1 0.489 0.335 0 0.978 0 0.144 0.561 0.800 0.886 
GD2 0.140 0.209 0 0.861 0 0 2.22e-16 0.253 0.485 
INCOME 0.338 0.091 0.030 0.500 0.213 0.275 0.345 0.405 0.456 
FOREIGN 0.006 0.040 0 0.496 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.722 0.093 0.023 0.965 0.612 0.693 0.746 0.781 0.800 
EQUITY 0.089 0.023 0.046 0.289 0.069 0.077 0.085 0.096 0.109 
LIQUID_RISK 0.647 0.123 0.002 0.895 0.498 0.582 0.664 0.731 0.785 
log(TA) 14.74 0.898 13.59 17.44 13.84 14.02 14.46 15.26 16.14 
N = 2403 n = 427         
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-
year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
logZ: log of Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification 
index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets;Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of 
banks; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics – Very large banks (Total assets ≥ $10 Billion)1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.025 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.016 
ROE 0.157 0.030 0.057 0.236 0.124 0.141 0.158 0.178 0.190 
SdROA 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.006 0.0003 0.0007 0.001 0.002 0.004 
SdROE 0.019 0.017 0.002 0.087 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.026 0.048 
RaROA 11.56 7.473 1.576 34.52 3.291 5.780 9.475 15.92 22.65 
RaROE 12.15 7.844 1.648 30.95 3.436 5.497 10.53 18.41 23.58 
Z 106.3 92.13 12.43 520.1 23.65 44.98 73.09 135.2 248.2 
LogZ 4.289 0.947 1.877 8.021 3.058 3.714 4.242 4.895 5.477 
GD1 0.752 0.277 0.017 0.970 0.130 0.674 0.896 0.936 0.951 
GD2 0.577 0.275 0 0.918 0.053 0.423 0.690 0.789 0.846 
INCOME 0.452 0.042 0.275 0.500 0.391 0.432 0.461 0.489 0.498 
FOREIGN 0.092 0.155 0 0.500 0 0.0003 0.020 0.090 0.439 
LOAN 0.772 0.057 0.597 0.940 0.684 0.748 0.781 0.799 0.834 
EQUITY 0.085 0.016 0.056 0.163 0.067 0.075 0.084 0.095 0.104 
LIQUID_RISK 0.523 0.128 0.120 0.757 0.359 0.471 0.550 0.597 0.662 
log(TA) 18.31 0.783 17.32 20.38 17.51 17.73 18.11 18.67 19.70 
N = 172 n = 30         
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-
year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
logZ: log of Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification 
index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets;Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of 
banks; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 3: Comparative descriptive statistics for non-diversified and diversified bank sub-samples1 
 Non-Diversified banks Diversified banks   
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p50 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p50   
ROA 0.0113 0.005 -0.011 0.028 0.011 0.0115 0.005 -0.011 0.028 0.011   
ROE 0.109 0.050 -0.039 0.265 0.105 0.122 0.049 -0.039 0.265 0.121   
SdROA 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.016 0.001   
SdROE 0.020 0.019 0.001 0.127 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.001 0.127 0.015   
RaROA 9.780 7.243 0.896 34.62 7.655 10.23 7.484 0.894 34.57 8.044   
RaROE 9.372 6.603 1.144 31.16 7.524 9.897 6.838 1.143 31.14 8.040   
Z 121.2 127.1 5.320 923.1 80.13 116.0 123.3 5.339 921.3 75.88   
INCOME 0.238 0.090 0 0.500 0.230 0.275 0.088 0.0017 0.500 0.269   
FOREIGN 0.0006 0.014 0 0.500 0 0.0012 0.018 0 0.500 0   
LOAN 0.681 0.115 0 1.000 0.712 0.715 0.091 0.023 0.952 0.740   
EQUITY 0.110 0.038 -0.015 0.767 0.101 0.096 0.024 -0.015 0.382 0.091   
LIQUID_RISK 0.737 0.095 0.002 0.979 0.752 0.715 0.094 0.058 0.928 0.727   
TA 119340.7 228342.5 1242 13630042 64977 1985573.2 25151482.2 6690 1610162539 178812   
N = 42497 N=22884 
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-year window 
standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; INCOME: diversification index 
across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; EQUITY: Total 
equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets;TA: Total assets; N: number of observations; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 4.1: Correlation matrix (GD1)1 
 
 GD1 GD1² Log(TA) SIZE INCOME FOREIGN LOAN EQUITY LIQUID_RISK 
GD1 1         
GD1² 0.950 1        
Log(TA) 0.500 0.523 1       
SIZE 0.122 0.170 0.920 1      
INCOME 0.207 0.212 0.323 0.277 1     
FOREIGN 0.0160 0.0180 0.162 0.178 0.0844 1    
LOAN 0.165 0.160 0.193 0.147 0.259 0.0218 1   
EQUITY -0.174 -0.150 -0.227 -0.182 -0.262 -0.0240 -0.185 1  
LIQUID_RISK -0.110 -0.116 -0.359 -0.361 -0.0779 -0.205 -0.00946 -0.152 1 
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic 
diversification index; GD1²: squared value of GD1;Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); SIZE: orthogonalized value of log (TA) with 
GD1 as measure of geographic diversification;INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification 
index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; 
LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets. 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation matrix (GD2)1 
 
 GD2 GD2² Log(TA) SIZE INCOME FOREIGN LOAN EQUITY LIQUID_RISK 
GD2 1         
GD2² 0.948 1        
Log(TA) 0.440 0.419 1       
SIZE 0.274 0.261 0.984 1      
INCOME 0.179 0.169 0.323 0.311 1     
FOREIGN 0.0983 0.0914 0.162 0.154 0.0844 1    
LOAN 0.0719 0.0684 0.193 0.193 0.259 0.0218 1   
EQUITY -0.0719 -0.0599 -0.227 -0.229 -0.262 -0.0240 -0.185 1  
LIQUID_RISK -0.151 -0.141 -0.359 -0.354 -0.0779 -0.205 -0.00946 -0.152 1 
1From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). GD2: across state geographic diversification index; GD2²: squared 
value of GD2;Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); SIZE: orthogonalized value of log (TA) with GD2 as measure of geographic 
diversification;INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign 
loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets. 
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Table 5: Effect of Geographic Diversification on Bank Risk and Performance 
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GD)from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006(before 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification orinterstate diversification. Other control: other 
control variables presented in section 3.4. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. The marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the 
geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not significant.K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for weak instrument; J 
statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions. t statistics in parentheses, *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. All models include bank and year 
effects. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.010
***
 12.31
***
 10.47
***
 -0.001 0.92
***
 0.009
***
 8.08 18.43
***
 -0.002 1.39
**
 
 (8.09) (4.49) (4.05) (-0.88) (2.59) (4.60) (1.58) (3.27) (-1.52) (2.56) 
GD² -0.007
***
 -11.54
***
 -9.04
***
 0.0016 -0.81
*
 -0.006
**
 -7.85 -24.81
**
 0.004 -1.35 
 (-5.15) (-3.42) (-2.83) (1.18) (-1.85) (-2.01) (-0.88) (-2.40) (1.57) (-1.45) 
SIZE 0.003
***
 1.98
***
 1.45
***
 -0.0006
***
 0.28
***
 0.002
***
 1.12
***
 1.27
***
 -0.0007
***
 0.24
***
 
 (16.67) (7.11) (5.79) (-4.99) (7.52) (14.94) (3.73) (4.66) (-7.00) (7.17) 
INCOME 0.001
*
 -5.96
***
 -6.07
***
 0.002
***
 -1.15
***
 0.0001 -5.39
***
 -5.52
***
 0.002
***
 -1.17
***
 
 (1.95) (-7.40) (-7.99) (5.65) (-10.68) (0.18) (-6.03) (-6.50) (5.79) (-10.92) 
FOREIGN 0.0004 -12.32
*
 -1.40 0.004
**
 0.58 0.002 -8.40 1.34 0.004
**
 0.83 
 (0.09) (-1.70) (-0.18) (2.05) (0.74) (0.40) (-1.08) (0.17) (2.19) (1.00) 
LOAN -0.001
***
 -0.22 -0.12 -0.0004 0.18 -0.0013
***
 0.23 -0.013 -0.0003 0.17 
 (-3.37) (-0.26) (-0.15) (-1.19) (1.64) (-2.64) (0.24) (-0.01) (-0.98) (1.58) 
EQUITY 0.058
***
 24.65
***
 2.74 -0.005
***
 7.76
***
 0.06
***
 22.59
***
 2.74 -0.006
***
 7.65
***
 
 (32.31) (8.04) (0.99) (-4.46) (19.36) (30.35) (6.62) (0.89) (-5.12) (19.38) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.001
***
 -2.44
***
 -1.53
*
 0.001
***
 -0.59
***
 -0.002
***
 -3.92
***
 -2.51
***
 0.001
***
 -0.64
***
 
 (-2.84) (-2.59) (-1.73) (3.94) (-4.99) (-3.56) (-3.76) (-2.59) (3.91) (-5.40) 
SDUNEMP -0.0001
***
 -0.12 -0.10 0.00005
**
 -0.018
*
 -0.0001
***
 -0.18
**
 -0.20
**
 0.00005
**
 -0.019
**
 
 (-2.99) (-1.56) (-1.36) (2.04) (-1.95) (-3.86) (-2.08) (-2.55) (2.07) (-2.09) 
SINGLESTATE 0.00003 0.14 0.107 0.000003 0.0191 0.0001 0.45 0.66
**
 -0.00004 0.05 
 (0.36) (0.59) (0.45) (0.06) (0.67) (1.13) (1.44) (2.13) (-0.66) (1.42) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.001
***
 1.93
***
 1.67
***
 -0.0001 0.0898
*
 0.0009
***
 0.63
***
 0.53
**
 -0.0001
***
 0.07
***
 
 (8.17) (4.71) (4.33) (-0.98) (1.75) (9.11) (2.80) (2.48) (-2.84) (2.90) 
Other Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 50323 44021 42494 38866 45242 44383 38764 37342 38866 45242 
n  6156 6019 5970 5783 6001 5961 5814 5741 5783 6001 
R2 0.146 0.0251 0.0213 0.0320 0.0527 0.135 0.0249 0.0209 0.0328 0.0526 
K-P statistic 581.71 518.96 460.92 207.35 347.40 140.94 125.94 115.36 60.35 138.64 
J statistic 0.670 0.165 0.899 3.755 8.756* 6.455 2.045 0.726 6.34 4.538 
Marginal effect 0.01 8,98648 7,97496 
NS 
0,70644 0,009 
NS 
17.76 
NS 
1.35 
z statistic 9.061*** 4.79*** 4.46*** 2.83** 5.21*** 3.477*** 2.74** 
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Table6: Geographic diversification and bank size  
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model across three sub-samples of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B<TA < $10B) andvery large banks (TA ≥ $10B)) 
using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV) from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained 
variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification or interstate diversification.Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.4. N: 
number of observations; n: number of banks.Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index 
computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index.NS: not significant. R2: R squared. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J 
statistic of overidentifying restrictions. t statistics in parentheses, *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
Small banks (TA≤ $1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.01
***
 14.64
***
 10.09
***
 -0.002 1.22
***
 0.007
*
 12.08 13.84 -0.004 1.17 
 (7.88) (4.93) (3.62) (-1.51) (3.15) (1.74) (1.42) (1.55) (-1.02) (1.30) 
GD² -0.0084
***
 -14.57
***
 -8.12
**
 0.003
*
 -1.10
**
 0.003 -6.68 -6.89 0.006 -0.21 
 (-4.82) (-3.89) (-2.30) (1.85) (-2.26) (0.37) (-0.36) (-0.34) (0.68) (-0.11) 
SIZE 0.003
***
 2.20
***
 1.68
***
 -0.0007
***
 0.32
***
 0.003
***
 1.53
***
 1.45
***
 -0.0008
***
 0.27
***
 
 (16.52) (7.59) (6.32) (-4.99) (8.00) (15.09) (5.01) (5.03) (-7.24) (7.70) 
INCOME 0.001
**
 -5.86
***
 -5.95
***
 0.002
***
 -1.17
***
 0.0001 -5.38
***
 -5.51
***
 0.002
***
 -1.20
***
 
 (1.99) (-7.19) (-7.77) (5.81) (-10.65) (0.18) (-5.97) (-6.44) (6.01) (-10.97) 
FOREIGN 0.017 -17.70 -5.44 -0.004 1.97 0.02
*
 18.69 18.32 -0.004 1.95 
 (1.39) (-0.77) (-0.22) (-0.44) (1.18) (1.77) (0.76) (0.80) (-0.44) (1.18) 
LOAN -0.001
***
 -0.11 -0.29 -0.0003 0.16 -0.001
**
 0.19 -0.29 -0.0003 0.15 
 (-3.26) (-0.13) (-0.36) (-1.03) (1.37) (-2.49) (0.20) (-0.31) (-0.86) (1.32) 
EQUITY 0.06
***
 25.51
***
 4.12 -0.005
***
 7.98
***
 0.06
***
 24.07
***
 4.14 -0.006
***
 7.84
***
 
 (31.84) (8.17) (1.46) (-4.71) (19.45) (29.96) (6.95) (1.33) (-5.38) (19.45) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.001
**
 -2.25
**
 -1.66
*
 0.001
***
 -0.51
***
 -0.001
***
 -3.46
***
 -2.42
**
 0.001
***
 -0.56
***
 
 (-2.27) (-2.35) (-1.84) (3.57) (-4.17) (-2.96) (-3.27) (-2.45) (3.46) (-4.60) 
SDUNEMP -0.0001
***
 -0.12 -0.12 0.00005
*
 -0.02
**
 -0.0001
***
 -0.18
**
 -0.23
***
 0.00005
**
 -0.02
**
 
 (-3.04) (-1.51) (-1.60) (1.96) (-1.99) (-3.83) (-2.13) (-2.78) (1.97) (-2.08) 
SINGLESTATE 0.00005 0.16 0.11 0.00005 -0.001 0.0001 0.63
*
 0.65
*
 -0.00001 0.03 
 (0.52) (0.61) (0.43) (0.85) (-0.05) (1.02) (1.84) (1.90) (-0.17) (0.89) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.001
***
 2.18
***
 1.60
***
 -0.0001 0.13
**
 0.001
***
 0.72
***
 0.55
**
 -0.0002
***
 0.08
***
 
 (7.94) (5.02) (3.93) (-1.24) (2.38) (9.61) (3.12) (2.52) (-3.30) (3.39) 
Other Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 48346 42400 40880 37307 43432 42601 37299 35877 37307 43432 
n  5909 5771 5725 5534 5738 5701 5562 5484 5534 5738 
R2 0.149 0.0256 0.0220 0.0321 0.0536 0.137 0.0250 0.0212 0.0331 0.0534 
K-P statistic 517.88 460.48 424.16 194.04 311.52 77.42 63.14 63.49 79.10 80.17 
J statistic 0.672 0.102 1.247 4.751 7.951* 8.958* 1.52 0.67 7.019 3.81 
Marginal effect 0,009 12,83 8,45 NS 0,95 NS NS NS NS NS 
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z statistic 7.66*** 5.07*** 3.97*** 3.41*** 
 
Large banks ($1B <TA<$10B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.004 3.07 18.28 0.003 -1.53 -0.0001 -35.92
**
 -0.56 0.002 -0.07 
 (1.11) (0.23) (1.30) (0.91) (-0.90) (-0.02) (-2.24) (-0.03) (0.36) (-0.04) 
GD² -0.006
*
 0.24 -19.89 -0.002 0.67 -0.006 23.91 -12.18 0.002 -0.39 
 (-1.71) (0.02) (-1.52) (-0.54) (0.44) (-1.15) (1.22) (-0.61) (0.36) (-0.18) 
SIZE 0.0001 2.35 0.42 0.0005 -0.22 -0.00001 -4.277
*
 -1.34 0.0008 -0.30 
 (0.22) (1.14) (0.24) (1.17) (-1.10) (-0.02) (-1.82) (-0.67) (0.93) (-1.40) 
INCOME 0.004 -0.03 -12.16
*
 -0.003
**
 -0.24 0.003 -2.26 -9.29 -0.002 -0.22 
 (1.53) (-0.00) (-1.87) (-2.17) (-0.34) (1.13) (-0.31) (-1.33) (-1.61) (-0.31) 
FOREIGN 0.001 -5.91 18.71
**
 0.001 -0.14 -0.001 -3.60 10.80 0.001 0.41 
 (0.55) (-0.65) (1.97) (1.10) (-0.21) (-0.49) (-0.35) (1.11) (0.80) (0.56) 
LOAN -0.001 11.28 13.11 -0.0006 1.34 -0.002 14.34 10.44 -0.0002 1.15 
 (-0.40) (1.38) (1.64) (-0.40) (1.41) (-0.65) (1.62) (1.24) (-0.14) (1.20) 
EQUITY 0.04
***
 11.32 -22.08 0.006 4.59
*
 0.04
***
 18.01 -33.06 0.005 3.99 
 (4.65) (0.49) (-1.07) (1.11) (1.73) (4.73) (0.79) (-1.59) (0.89) (1.53) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.003
**
 -3.25 10.03
*
 0.002 -1.71
**
 -0.004
**
 -14.00
*
 2.52 0.002
*
 -1.74
**
 
 (-2.13) (-0.50) (1.68) (1.64) (-2.56) (-2.47) (-1.95) (0.40) (1.81) (-2.56) 
SDUNEMP -0.0002 0.51 0.41 0.0001 -0.02 -0.0001 0.36 0.57 0.0002 -0.02 
 (-1.38) (0.69) (0.65) (1.29) (-0.24) (-0.93) (0.41) (0.83) (1.16) (-0.25) 
SINGLESTATE -0.0001 0.29 0.38 -0.0003
**
 0.13 0.0001 0.63
*
 0.60
*
 -0.0003
**
 0.15
*
 
 (-0.65) (0.39) (0.53) (-2.32) (1.61) (1.02) (1.84) (1.90) (-2.47) (1.72) 
SINGLECOUNTY -0.0003 -1.14 1.98 0.0003 -0.10 0.001
***
 0.72
***
 0.55
**
 0.0003 -0.05 
 (-0.64) (-0.71) (1.05) (0.91) (-0.51) (9.61) (3.12) (2.52) (1.28) (-0.31) 
Other Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1773 1426 1425 1402 1620 1596 1291 1293 1402 1620 
n  327 302 296 291 318 312 290 285 291 318 
r2 0.085 0.028 0.030 0.055 0.041 0.078 0.023 0.038 0.05 0.041 
K-P statistic 38.47 28.10 31.32 22.50 23.51 11.80 9.97 8.95 11.05 11.50 
J statistic 1.130 2.950 0.411 1.485 1.488 4.039 7.95* 2.38 5.007 3.082 
Marginal effect NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
 
 
  
35 
 
 
Very large banks (TA ≥$10B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.039 147.50
*
 140.60 -0.01 13.24 0.0007 44.84 45.54 -0.01 9.25
**
 
 (1.34) (1.74) (1.51) (-1.00) (1.40) (0.05) (0.88) (0.87) (-1.33) (1.99) 
GD² -0.009 -96.71 -118.10 0.020
*
 -10.23 0.005 -25.24 -38.78 0.009 -7.80
**
 
 (-0.42) (-1.45) (-1.63) (1.71) (-1.48) (0.41) (-0.53) (-0.87) (1.53) (-2.03) 
SIZE 0.0008 17.02
***
 10.62 -0.00195
*
 1.94
***
 0.001 9.22
**
 9.678
**
 -0.0009 0.89
**
 
 (0.41) (2.75) (1.31) (-1.79) (2.99) (0.75) (2.12) (2.06) (-1.34) (1.98) 
INCOME 0.027 1.65 44.78 -0.0026 1.52 0.01 67.76 79.75 -0.01 9.63
**
 
 (1.61) (0.03) (0.68) (-0.31) (0.29) (0.80) (1.51) (1.62) (-1.33) (2.13) 
FOREIGN 0.029
**
 -56.80 -13.58 0.018
**
 -7.07 0.007 -41.27 -17.11 0.0075
*
 -2.07 
 (2.11) (-1.40) (-0.30) (2.52) (-1.64) (0.78) (-1.52) (-0.59) (1.69) (-0.77) 
LOAN 0.005 60.80
**
 80.06
**
 -0.011
**
 6.49
**
 -0.006 46.04
*
 38.80 -0.009
**
 7.78
***
 
 (0.56) (2.01) (2.39) (-2.20) (2.17) (-0.69) (1.65) (1.23) (-2.01) (3.03) 
EQUITY 0.02 -3.77 -223.60
**
 0.008 -9.38 0.05
**
 -11.78 -166.30
*
 0.009 -3.41 
 (0.98) (-0.05) (-2.38) (0.59) (-1.13) (1.98) (-0.15) (-1.83) (0.76) (-0.46) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.005 30.68 32.13 -0.007
*
 4.00
*
 0.003 10.56 28.82 -0.003 2.86
*
 
 (-0.74) (1.19) (1.21) (-1.70) (1.67) (0.56) (0.61) (1.49) (-1.04) (1.67) 
SDUNEMP 0.0003 1.92 1.81 -0.00006 0.11 0.0003 2.00 2.47 0.00002 -0.02 
 (0.57) (1.33) (0.99) (-0.25) (0.72) (0.75) (1.29) (1.55) (0.12) (-0.23) 
SINGLESTATE 0.0007 10.45
***
 5.72 -0.001
***
 1.02
***
 0.001 6.41 5.10 -0.002
**
 1.60
***
 
 (0.18) (2.84) (1.34) (-2.90) (3.05) (1.22) (1.07) (0.97) (-2.22) (3.09) 
SINGLECOUNTY - - - - - - - - - - 
           
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 107 98 90 128 130 130 115 111 128 130 
n  23 22 22 23 23 23 22 22 23 23 
r2 0.465 0.442 0.459 0.449 0.440 0.363 0.355 0.371 0.407 0.395 
K-P statistic 6.53 6.26 5.25 6.14 6.46 21.356 13.97 17.08 20.33 21.35 
J statistic 6.56 7.16 3.74 13.18** 10.01* 2.75 4.29 8.14 0.87 2.45 
Marginal effect NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 0.24 
z statistic          1.97** 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Effect of Geographic Diversification on Bank Risk and Performance – Crisis period (2007-2008) 
This table reports the OLS regression results of our baseline model using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GD) over the crisis period (2007-
2008). Explained variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification or interstate diversification. Other control: other control 
variables presented in section 3.4. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. The marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to 
the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not significant. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for 
weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions.  t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1.1. All models include bank and year effects. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.005 10.68 6.61 -0.006
*
 2.73
**
 -0.006 -34.10 4.51 0.001 -1.69 
 (0.88) (1.16) (0.69) (-1.71) (2.47) (-0.51) (-1.44) (0.17) (0.22) (-0.87) 
GD² -0.006 -24.07
*
 -16.39 0.006 -2.19 0.004 41.27 -37.54 -0.007 5.66 
 (-0.67) (-1.75) (-1.18) (1.20) (-1.47) (0.19) (0.81) (-0.53) (-0.52) (1.58) 
SIZE 0.001 -5.14
**
 -2.69 -0.001
*
 0.61
**
 0.001 -5.04
**
 -2.46 -0.001
*
 0.61
**
 
 (0.91) (-2.37) (-1.34) (-1.93) (2.42) (0.99) (-2.43) (-1.26) (-1.89) (2.46) 
INCOME -0.003 -7.90
*
 -9.95
***
 0.003
**
 -0.25 -0.003 -7.33
*
 -9.68
**
 0.003
**
 -0.25 
 (-1.10) (-1.91) (-2.61) (2.41) (-0.63) (-1.07) (-1.78) (-2.53) (2.37) (-0.65) 
FOREIGN -0.04
*
 90.74 -84.38
***
 0.03
**
 -0.96 -0.03
*
 122.7
**
 -123.0 0.02 0.78 
 (-1.93) (1.44) (-3.02) (2.22) (-0.30) (-1.87) (2.53) (-1.23) (1.50) (0.38) 
LOAN 0.002 0.31 -5.60 -0.001 0.12 0.002 0.64 -5.47 -0.002 0.12 
 (0.64) (0.06) (-1.09) (-0.98) (0.19) (0.60) (0.12) (-1.06) (-0.95) (0.19) 
SDUNEMP -0.002
***
 -1.81
***
 -1.77
***
 0.001
***
 -0.44
***
 -0.002
***
 -1.78
***
 -1.76
***
 0.001
***
 -0.44
***
 
 (-10.96) (-4.75) (-4.70) (10.11) (-10.70) (-11.00) (-4.70) (-4.75) (10.06) (-10.69) 
EQUITY 0.09
***
 29.99
*
 25.30 -0.04
***
 21.54
***
 0.09
***
 30.75
*
 26.44 -0.04
***
 21.45
***
 
 (6.64) (1.68) (1.46) (-4.76) (7.99) (6.66) (1.73) (1.57) (-4.75) (7.98) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.001 1.81 1.92 0.002
*
 -0.33 -0.001 1.92 2.07 0.003
*
 -0.32 
 (-0.63) (0.45) (0.46) (1.74) (-0.81) (-0.56) (0.48) (0.50) (1.72) (-0.79) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.0001 2.35
*
 1.40 0.0001 0.11 -0.00003 0.32 0.49 0.0003 0.01 
 (0.21) (1.87) (1.16) (0.34) (0.79) (-0.06) (0.31) (0.53) (0.81) (0.08) 
SINGLESTATE -0.0006
*
 0.26 0.18 0.00008 0.01 -0.0007
**
 0.33 0.34 0.0001 0.001 
 (-1.90) (0.37) (0.24) (0.40) (0.14) (-2.08) (0.47) (0.44) (0.48) (0.02) 
Constant 0.00559 8.932 14.62
**
 0.00467
*
 2.302
***
 0.00611 9.540 14.50
***
 0.00405
*
 2.614
***
 
 (1.39) (1.46) (2.53) (1.89) (3.41) (1.61) (1.63) (2.63) (1.75) (4.11) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7935 6514 6262 7928 8161 7935 6514 6262 7928 8161 
n 4266 3893 3794 4232 4283 4266 3893 3794 4232 4283 
R2 0.332 0.0754 0.0716 0.134 0.158 0.332 0.0739 0.0714 0.134 0.158 
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Table A2: Geographic diversification and bank size - Crisis period (2007-2008) 
This table reports the OLS regression results of our baseline model across three sub-samples of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B< TA < $10B) and very large 
banks (TA ≥ $10B)) using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV) over the crisis period (2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, 
RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification or interstate diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.4. N: 
number of observations; n: number of banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic 
diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not significant. R2: R squared. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for 
weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions.t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1.1. 
 
Small banks (TA ≤ $1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.01 7.48 5.42 -0.008
**
 3.25
***
 -0.014 -36.83 -31.26 0.009 -2.69 
 (1.44) (0.81) (0.57) (-2.10) (2.64) (-0.90) (-1.31) (-1.15) (1.16) (-1.19) 
GD² -0.008 -14.56 -9.04 0.006 -2.31 0.042 84.23 92.66 -0.041
**
 13.82
***
 
 (-0.78) (-1.07) (-0.62) (1.28) (-1.38) (1.28) (1.36) (1.44) (-2.38) (3.10) 
SIZE 0.003
**
 -4.07
*
 -1.77 -0.003
***
 0.93
***
 0.0033
**
 -3.65
*
 -1.69 -0.002
**
 0.89
***
 
 (2.30) (-1.93) (-0.88) (-2.64) (3.30) (2.31) (-1.75) (-0.85) (-2.52) (3.19) 
INCOME -0.003 -8.08
*
 -10.89
***
 0.003
**
 -0.38 -0.0032 -7.82
*
 -10.95
***
 0.003
**
 -0.40 
 (-1.01) (-1.96) (-2.85) (2.44) (-0.94) (-1.01) (-1.90) (-2.85) (2.47) (-1.00) 
FOREIGN 0.16
***
 533.6
***
 548.1
***
 -0.04
***
 18.59
***
 0.16
***
 508.9
***
 556.9
***
 -0.04
***
 18.51
***
 
 (11.53) (5.89) (5.80) (-4.35) (4.71) (10.92) (4.45) (4.86) (-4.46) (4.84) 
LOAN 0.002 -0.83 -5.48 -0.003 0.22 0.002 -0.46 -5.52 -0.003 0.22 
 (0.60) (-0.15) (-1.08) (-1.46) (0.34) (0.57) (-0.08) (-1.09) (-1.42) (0.35) 
SDUNEMP -0.002
***
 -1.70
***
 -1.75
***
 0.001
***
 -0.43
***
 -0.002
***
 -1.70
***
 -1.75
***
 0.001
***
 -0.43
***
 
 (-10.85) (-4.53) (-4.67) (9.48) (-10.28) (-10.88) (-4.54) (-4.68) (9.44) (-10.22) 
EQUITY 0.11
***
 42.18
**
 29.86
*
 -0.05
***
 22.28
***
 0.11
***
 44.32
**
 30.61
*
 -0.05
***
 22.08
***
 
 (6.75) (2.33) (1.74) (-4.77) (7.53) (6.74) (2.46) (1.80) (-4.74) (7.50) 
LIQUID_RISK 0.00006 0.32 0.46 0.002 -0.34 0.00008 0.14 0.072 0.002 -0.37 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (1.23) (-0.83) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (1.30) (-0.89) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.00008 1.77 1.05 0.0002 0.071 -0.00005 0.10 0.19 0.0003 -0.02 
 (0.11) (1.42) (0.97) (0.42) (0.46) (-0.08) (0.10) (0.22) (0.86) (-0.18) 
SINGLESTATE -0.0005 0.49 0.80 -0.00002 0.11 -0.0006 0.48 0.78 0.00002 0.09 
 (-1.31) (0.68) (1.08) (-0.09) (1.40) (-1.55) (0.66) (1.06) (0.12) (1.25) 
Constant 0.00197 7.437 13.55
**
 0.00661
**
 2.122
***
 0.00315 8.205 14.46
***
 0.00554
**
 2.514
***
 
 (0.47) (1.24) (2.35) (2.57) (3.12) (0.80) (1.42) (2.60) (2.33) (3.94) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7462 6154 5912 7468 7669 7462 6154 5912 7468 7669 
n 3996 3663 3561 3973 4016 3996 3663 3561 3973 4016 
R2 0.318 0.0625 0.0613 0.135 0.153 0.319 0.0618 0.0618 0.136 0.154 
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Large banks ($1B < TA < $10B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD -0.006 -64.14 -97.51
**
 -0.003 -2.29 -0.03 -59.08 -42.22 -0.006 -3.08 
 (-0.23) (-1.06) (-2.01) (-0.20) (-0.43) (-1.43) (-1.03) (-1.13) (-0.55) (-0.64) 
GD² 0.003 6.67 32.21 0.008 -2.67 -0.01 -39.83 -76.81
*
 0.024 -2.94 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.69) (0.43) (-0.51) (-0.42) (-0.78) (-1.94) (1.48) (-0.53) 
SIZE -0.009
**
 -17.67 -7.17 0.005
***
 -2.93
***
 -0.008
*
 -14.44 -2.47 0.006
***
 -3.17
***
 
 (-2.41) (-1.41) (-0.79) (2.60) (-3.66) (-1.91) (-1.15) (-0.28) (2.71) (-3.71) 
INCOME -0.01 -28.03 -18.94 -0.001 1.64 -0.01 -31.10 -23.12 -0.0004 1.43 
 (-1.38) (-0.86) (-0.80) (-0.12) (0.68) (-1.26) (-0.98) (-0.94) (-0.04) (0.59) 
FOREIGN -0.09 -36.43 166.1 0.11
***
 7.30 -0.17
***
 -253.0 -214.2 0.11
***
 6.50 
 (-1.59) (-0.14) (0.86) (2.74) (1.64) (-4.00) (-0.91) (-1.03) (3.74) (1.65) 
LOAN 0.006 -7.04 -48.62 0.03 -4.42 0.002 1.41 -38.55 0.03 -4.19 
 (0.38) (-0.12) (-0.90) (1.49) (-1.08) (0.16) (0.02) (-0.71) (1.45) (-1.01) 
SDUNEMP -0.001 -1.43 0.62 0.002
***
 -0.60
***
 -0.001 -2.03 -0.80 0.002
***
 -0.56
**
 
 (-1.20) (-0.57) (0.31) (3.13) (-2.74) (-1.46) (-0.82) (-0.43) (2.83) (-2.53) 
EQUITY -0.02 -52.36 -11.38 -0.02 18.02
***
 -0.02 -43.88 22.40 -0.02 17.57
***
 
 (-0.80) (-0.87) (-0.12) (-1.13) (3.44) (-0.53) (-0.73) (0.26) (-1.20) (3.55) 
LIQUID_RISK 0.0002 51.46
**
 33.75
**
 0.005 1.43 -0.0009 50.26
***
 34.84
**
 0.006 1.49 
 (0.03) (2.58) (2.46) (0.92) (0.84) (-0.13) (2.63) (2.58) (0.93) (0.87) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.0009 11.50
***
 9.74 -0.0008 0.78
*
 0.001 10.57
***
 8.60 -0.0006 0.75
*
 
 (0.67) (3.52) (1.03) (-0.74) (1.94) (0.77) (3.07) (0.93) (-0.62) (1.87) 
SINGLESTATE -0.001
**
 -2.29 -4.10
*
 0.0008 -0.58
***
 -0.001
***
 -1.99 -3.75 0.0007 -0.55
***
 
 (-2.55) (-1.00) (-1.89) (1.31) (-2.85) (-3.03) (-0.81) (-1.62) (1.16) (-2.73) 
Constant 0.0447
**
 82.80 90.27 -0.0431
**
 14.95
***
 0.0505
***
 57.85 47.11 -0.0453
**
 15.02
***
 
 (2.26) (1.10) (1.56) (-2.32) (3.30) (2.74) (0.83) (0.87) (-2.49) (3.64) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 453 343 336 438 470 453 343 336 438 470 
n 268 226 224 257 267 268 226 224 257 267 
R2 0.658 0.415 0.417 0.273 0.366 0.657 0.422 0.430 0.275 0.369 
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Table A3: Effect of Geographic Diversification on Bank Risk and Performance – Alternative measure of intrastate diversification 
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model using an alternative measure of intrastate diversification that counts individual MSAs separately but treats non-
MSA counties as a single entity from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006(before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, 
SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.4. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. The 
marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the 
geographic diversification index. NS: not significant. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap  rk F statistic for weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions.  t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. All models include bank and year effects. 
 
      
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.008
***
 6.61
***
 9.28
***
 -0.002
***
 0.81
***
 
 (8.08) (2.66) (3.93) (-3.39) (2.59) 
GD² -0.007
***
 -7.26
*
 -10.63
***
 0.003
***
 -1.32
***
 
 (-4.50) (-1.90) (-2.89) (3.81) (-2.80) 
SIZE 0.002
***
 1.95
***
 1.53
***
 -0.0007
***
 0.29
***
 
 (16.97) (7.25) (6.29) (-8.16) (7.93) 
SDUNEMP -0.0001
***
 -0.13 -0.09 0.00003
*
 -0.02
**
 
 (-3.06) (-1.63) (-1.34) (1.74) (-2.10) 
INCOME 0.0009
**
 -5.93
***
 -5.99
***
 0.002
***
 -1.15
***
 
 (1.97) (-7.38) (-7.92) (8.52) (-10.66) 
FOREIGN 0.00003 -13.37
*
 -2.51 0.005
**
 0.45 
 (0.01) (-1.83) (-0.32) (2.46) (0.57) 
LOAN -0.001
***
 -0.273 -0.18 -0.0003 0.19
*
 
 (-3.48) (-0.32) (-0.23) (-1.01) (1.68) 
EQUITY 0.06
***
 24.01
***
 2.56 -0.005
***
 7.81
***
 
 (32.37) (7.92) (0.93) (-5.08) (19.64) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.001
***
 -2.50
***
 -1.44 0.001
***
 -0.59
***
 
 (-2.93) (-2.67) (-1.64) (3.77) (-5.01) 
SINGLESTATE 0.00007 0.18 0.18 0.00003 0.004 
 (0.70) (0.75) (0.75) (0.66) (0.15) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.001
***
 0.92
***
 0.96
***
 -0.0001 0.04 
 (9.83) (3.70) (4.07) (-1.45) (1.52) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 50323 44021 42494 44405 45242 
n 6156 6019 5970 5978 6001 
R2 0.146 0.0255 0.0213 0.0376 0.0532 
K-P statistic 676.39 602.64 559.87 400.15 395.83 
J statistic 1.66 1.09 1.38 3.90 5.69 
Marginal effect 0.007 5.31 7.37 
NS 
0.57 
 Z statistic 8.83 2.80 4.11 2.38 
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Table A4: Geographic diversification and bank size – Alternative measure of intrastate diversification   
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model across three sub-samples of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B < TA < $10B) and very large 
banks (TA ≥ $10B)) using an alternative measure of intrastate diversification that counts individual MSAs separately but treats non-MSA counties as a single entity from 1994 
(Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate 
diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.4. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as 
the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not 
significant. R2: R squared. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions. t statistics in parentheses, 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
Small banks (TA ≤ $1B) 
      
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.008
***
 13.97
***
 9.64
***
 -0.003
***
 1.20
***
 
 (5.17) (4.27) (3.19) (-3.63) (3.35) 
GD² -0.003 -19.90
***
 -10.26
**
 0.005
***
 -2.00
***
 
 (-1.36) (-3.65) (-2.03) (3.60) (-3.39) 
SIZE 0.003
***
 2.22
***
 1.73
***
 -0.0008
***
 0.32
***
 
 (15.35) (6.66) (5.61) (-8.07) (8.26) 
SDUNEMP -0.0001
***
 -0.18
**
 -0.22
***
 0.00003 -0.02
**
 
 (-3.76) (-2.06) (-2.76) (1.64) (-2.10) 
INCOME 0.0002 -5.12
***
 -5.42
***
 0.002
***
 -1.16
***
 
 (0.43) (-5.68) (-6.33) (8.65) (-10.65) 
FOREIGN 0.02
*
 22.00 19.67 0.004 2.02 
 (1.78) (0.84) (0.79) (0.47) (1.20) 
LOAN -0.001
**
 0.18 -0.24 -0.0002 0.16 
 (-2.54) (0.18) (-0.27) (-0.79) (1.39) 
EQUITY 0.06
***
 26.41
***
 5.14 -0.005
***
 7.96
***
 
 (30.19) (7.56) (1.63) (-5.28) (19.61) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.001
**
 -2.86
***
 -2.21
**
 0.001
***
 -0.52
***
 
 (-2.34) (-2.70) (-2.22) (3.65) (-4.28) 
SINGLESTATE 0.00009 0.23 0.18 0.00008 -0.013 
 (0.80) (0.82) (0.66) (1.32) (-0.41) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.001
***
 1.08
***
 0.80
***
 -0.0001
*
 0.07
**
 
 (7.59) (3.74) (2.90) (-1.88) (2.18) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 42601 37299 35877 42652 43432 
n 5701 5562 5484 5720 5738 
R2 0.138 0.0249 0.0212 0.0380 0.0541 
K-P statistic 344.79 316.31 294.27 368.36 359.48 
J statistic 3.01 1.57 3.05 4.82 5.43 
Marginal effect 0.007 11.18 8.21 
NS 
0 .92 
 Z statistic 6.10 4.31 3.41 3.21 
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Large banks ($1B < TA < $10B) 
      
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.0031 -15.42 19.49 -0.002 -2.05 
 (0.75) (-0.87) (0.99) (-0.75) (-1.13) 
GD² -0.005 10.87 -26.75 0.003 1.41 
 (-1.23) (0.66) (-1.54) (1.14) (0.87) 
SIZE 0.0002 0.74 1.64 0.00003 -0.24 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.73) (0.11) (-1.10) 
SDUNEMP -0.0002 0.57 0.49 0.0001 -0.01 
 (-1.34) (0.67) (0.72) (1.22) (-0.25) 
INCOME 0.005 -0.71 -8.45 -0.001 -0.31 
 (1.64) (-0.10) (-1.21) (-0.73) (-0.42) 
FOREIGN -0.0004 -9.43 8.99 0.001 -0.03 
 (-0.16) (-0.96) (0.99) (0.92) (-0.05) 
LOAN -0.003 14.02 11.98 -0.003 1.32 
 (-0.97) (1.59) (1.44) (-1.50) (1.39) 
EQUITY 0.03
***
 20.21 -25.96 0.004 4.25 
 (3.94) (0.81) (-1.21) (0.95) (1.57) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.004
**
 -7.06 6.33 0.0005 -1.62
**
 
 (-2.21) (-0.95) (0.98) (0.54) (-2.42) 
SINGLESTATE -0.00004 0.65 0.64 -0.0003
**
 0.12 
 (-0.19) (0.81) (0.80) (-2.23) (1.52) 
SINGLECOUNTY -0.0005 -1.60 3.25
*
 0.0002 -0.17 
 (-0.99) (-1.00) (1.68) (0.84) (-0.59) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1596 1291 1293 1570 1620 
n 312 290 285 312 318 
R2 0.0806 0.0376 0.0399 0.0437 0.0408 
K-P statistic 22.48 15.44 16.13 20.20 23.49 
J statistic 0.88 4.93 2.53 2.49 0.31 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS NS NS 
 Z statistic 
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Very large banks (TA ≥ $10B) 
      
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.0049 99.04 176.8 -0.01 9.53 
 (0.07) (1.14) (1.36) (-0.74) (0.79) 
GD² 0.014 -75.21 -132.5 0.02 -9.97 
 (0.27) (-1.11) (-1.32) (1.44) (-1.08) 
SIZE 0.002 13.97
***
 14.59
***
 -0.001
*
 1.11
**
 
 (1.19) (2.90) (3.17) (-1.86) (2.44) 
SDUNEMP 0.0003 0.96 3.006
*
 -0.00005 0.09 
 (0.92) (0.97) (2.03) (-0.36) (1.06) 
INCOME 0.02 25.30 92.18 -0.01 8.02 
 (1.24) (0.40) (1.35) (-1.16) (1.56) 
FOREIGN 0.02 -43.10 -32.18 0.02
***
 -8.35
**
 
 (1.56) (-1.18) (-0.78) (3.79) (-2.19) 
LOAN -0.003 58.42
**
 70.50
**
 -0.009
*
 6.56
**
 
 (-0.35) (2.28) (2.16) (-1.73) (2.17) 
EQUITY 0.01 -26.52 -198.7
**
 0.005 -3.03 
 (0.38) (-0.40) (-1.97) (0.37) (-0.36) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.0005 33.36 33.87 -0.009
**
 3.6 
 (-0.07) (1.15) (1.18) (-2.30) (1.52) 
SINGLESTATE 0.002 11.39
***
 7.54
*
 -0.002
***
 1.07
***
 
 (0.85) (2.95) (1.87) (-2.97) (3.01) 
SINGLECOUNTY      
      
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 118 106 100 116 118 
n 23 22 22 23 23 
R2 0.323 0.382 0.364 0.426 0.398 
K-P statistic 7.21 7.49 5.32 6.18 6.51 
J statistic 5.13 8.19* 6.44 5.04 7.93* 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS NS NS 
 Z statistic 
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Table A5: Effect of Geographic Diversification on Bank Risk and Performance – only BHC 
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GD) from 1994 (Interstate Banking 
Act) to 2006(before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification or 
interstate diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.4. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. The marginal effect is calculated as the 
first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not 
significant. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. All models include bank and year effects. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.01
***
 10.07
***
 9.14
***
 -0.001
*
 0.83
**
 0.006
***
 4.89 12.54
***
 -0.001
*
 0.89
*
 
 (7.37) (3.48) (3.33) (-1.83) (2.20) (4.05) (1.12) (2.76) (-1.90) (1.87) 
GD² -0.008
***
 -9.46
***
 -7.77
**
 0.001
*
 -0.78
*
 -0.004
*
 -5.65 -19.19
**
 0.003
**
 -1.08 
 (-5.12) (-2.69) (-2.34) (1.72) (-1.72) (-1.78) (-0.75) (-2.38) (2.13) (-1.30) 
SIZE 0.002
***
 1.68
***
 1.13
***
 -0.0006
***
 0.25
***
 0.002
***
 1.06
***
 0.99
***
 -0.0005
***
 0.22
***
 
 (12.83) (5.49) (4.07) (-5.95) (5.94) (12.07) (3.91) (4.01) (-7.55) (6.78) 
SDUNEMP -0.00008
**
 -0.11 -0.12 0.00001 -0.0148 -0.00008
**
 -0.12 -0.12 0.00001 -0.01 
 (-2.11) (-1.30) (-1.50) (0.69) (-1.45) (-2.25) (-1.41) (-1.49) (0.64) (-1.31) 
INCOME 0.0009
*
 -5.99
***
 -5.87
***
 0.002
***
 -1.21
***
 0.0008 -6.12
***
 -5.81
***
 0.002
***
 -1.29
***
 
 (1.77) (-6.52) (-6.77) (6.93) (-9.94) (1.57) (-6.68) (-6.72) (8.67) (-11.70) 
FOREIGN -0.003 -15.43
*
 -3.42 0.004
**
 0.44 -0.002 -14.59
*
 -4.53 0.005
***
 0.27 
 (-1.35) (-1.87) (-0.41) (2.36) (0.46) (-1.02) (-1.77) (-0.54) (2.78) (0.22) 
LOAN -0.001
**
 -0.24 0.04 -0.0006
*
 0.23
*
 -0.001
**
 -0.26 -0.035 -0.0001 0.087 
 (-2.50) (-0.24) (0.05) (-1.87) (1.72) (-2.44) (-0.25) (-0.04) (-0.34) (0.73) 
EQUITY 0.06
***
 24.47
***
 -0.05 -0.003
***
 7.47
***
 0.05
***
 22.06
***
 -1.09 -0.003
***
 7.47
***
 
 (28.07) (6.80) (-0.02) (-3.50) (16.00) (27.61) (6.22) (-0.34) (-3.76) (18.00) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.001
***
 -3.11
***
 -1.91
*
 0.001
***
 -0.66
***
 -0.001
***
 -3.79
***
 -2.05
**
 0.001
***
 -0.63
***
 
 (-2.62) (-2.95) (-1.91) (4.54) (-4.97) (-3.66) (-3.62) (-2.06) (4.46) (-5.28) 
SINGLESTATE -0.00004 0.18 0.06 0.00001 0.02 0.00004 0.27 0.39 0.00001 0.02 
 (-0.42) (0.71) (0.26) (0.18) (0.69) (0.35) (0.91) (1.34) (0.23) (0.66) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.001
***
 1.79
***
 1.79
***
 -0.00007 0.09
*
 0.001
***
 0.93
***
 0.86
***
 -0.0001
**
 0.09
***
 
 (8.41) (4.13) (4.34) (-0.56) (1.65) (10.76) (4.24) (4.14) (-2.37) (3.71) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39450 34727 33458 34807 35413 39450 34727 33458 34807 35413 
n 4824 4731 4688 4671 4683 4824 4731 4688 4671 4683 
R2 0.146 0.0260 0.0215 0.0397 0.0536 0.146 0.0260 0.0215 0.0397 0.0536 
K-P statistic 479.25 443.68 393.43 307.41 291.99 289.40 243.20 225.93 270.16 283.98 
J statistic 0.29 0.89 1.52 5.18 6.86 2.46 1.37 3.02 5.19 1.78 
Marginal effect 0.0077 7.45 6.99 
NS 
0.61 0.006 
NS 
12.01 
NS NS 
z statistic 8.04 3.68 3.65 2.14 4.13 2.76 
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Table A6: Geographic diversification and bank size – only BHC   
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model across three sub-samples of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B < TA < $10B) and very large 
banks (TA ≥ $10B)) using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GD) from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis 
of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, RaROA, RaROE, SdROA and logZ. GD: measures of intrastate diversification or interstate diversification. Other control: other 
control variables presented in section 3.4. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained 
variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not significant. R2: R squared. K-P 
statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
Small banks (TA ≤ $1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.01
***
 13.44
***
 9.62
***
 -0.002
**
 1.14
***
 0.006
*
 7.03 5.84 -0.0005 0.12 
 (6.09) (3.65) (2.74) (-1.98) (2.76) (1.84) (0.90) (0.72) (-0.27) (0.15) 
GD² -0.007
***
 -12.27
***
 -6.99 0.002
*
 -1.09
**
 -0.001 -5.40 1.53 -0.001 1.17 
 (-3.62) (-2.64) (-1.58) (1.71) (-2.13) (-0.12) (-0.32) (0.08) (-0.27) (0.63) 
SIZE 0.00”*** 2.00*** 1.44
***
 -0.0006
***
 0.28
***
 0.002
***
 1.29
***
 1.19
***
 -0.0006
***
 0.24
***
 
 (11.53) (5.12) (4.01) (-5.89) (6.29) (11.94) (4.57) (4.50) (-7.55) (7.18) 
SDUNEMP -0.0001
***
 -0.15 -0.28
***
 0.00001 -0.01 -0.00008
**
 -0.12 -0.15
*
 0.00001 -0.01 
 (-2.66) (-1.54) (-3.05) (0.62) (-1.38) (-2.26) (-1.40) (-1.88) (0.52) (-1.27) 
INCOME 0.0002 -5.52
***
 -5.33
***
 0.002
***
 -1.21
***
 0.0007 -6.08
***
 -5.66
***
 0.002
***
 -1.28
***
 
 (0.37) (-5.34) (-5.40) (7.10) (-9.78) (1.39) (-6.54) (-6.45) (8.81) (-11.44) 
FOREIGN -0.04
***
 -94.16
***
 -70.85
***
 0.006 -8.16
**
 -0.06
***
 -115.90
***
 -89.43
***
 0.012
***
 -11.50
***
 
 (-4.29) (-3.49) (-3.12) (1.54) (-2.15) (-2.90) (-3.41) (-3.01) (2.65) (-2.88) 
LOAN -0.001
**
 0.50 0.11 -0.0005 0.20 -0.001
**
 -0.10 -0.12 -0.00005 0.067 
 (-2.16) (0.42) (0.10) (-1.61) (1.51) (-2.35) (-0.10) (-0.13) (-0.17) (0.56) 
EQUITY 0.06
***
 29.88
***
 4.82 -0.004
***
 7.78
***
 0.05
***
 23.01
***
 0.77 -0.004
***
 7.75
***
 
 (26.33) (7.12) (1.28) (-3.86) (16.21) (27.20) (6.37) (0.24) (-4.19) (18.27) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.0009 -3.19
***
 -2.46
**
 0.001
***
 -0.58
***
 -0.001
***
 -3.55
***
 -2.29
**
 0.0012
***
 -0.60
***
 
 (-1.57) (-2.64) (-2.16) (4.42) (-4.18) (-3.00) (-3.32) (-2.26) (4.52) (-4.86) 
SINGLESTATE -0.00002 0.20 0.09 0.00006 0.0001 0.0001 0.47 0.33 0.00006 -0.004 
 (-0.21) (0.68) (0.32) (0.94) (0.00) (0.85) (1.36) (0.99) (0.87) (-0.11) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.002
***
 2.04
***
 1.72
***
 -0.0001 0.13
**
 0.001
***
 1.00
***
 0.93
***
 -0.0001
***
 0.10
***
 
 (6.99) (3.92) (3.44) (-0.89) (2.33) (11.06) (4.48) (4.43) (-2.88) (4.33) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 33098 29186 28003 33121 33676 37552 33171 31910 37543 38162 
n 4413 4322 4254 4423 4430 4585 4491 4451 4590 4597 
R2 0.138 0.0252 0.0206 0.0403 0.0547 0.149 0.0267 0.0222 0.0447 0.0590 
K-P statistic 294.09 239.26 220.71 269.61 261.64 124.78 105.53 103.52 127.75 128.42 
J statistic 7.43 0.51 1.97 6.24 8.10* 0.55 1.89 0.48 5.06* 0.62 
Marginal effect 0.009 10.39 7.88 
NS 
0.87 
NS NS NS NS NS 
z statistic 6.84 3.94 3.15 2.91 
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Large banks ($1B < TA < $10B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.005 -14.12 14.00 -0.002 -1.15 -0.0002 -12.64 1.98 -0.003 0.60 
 (1.12) (-0.87) (0.75) (-0.83) (-0.67) (-0.06) (-0.93) (0.16) (-1.35) (0.43) 
GD² -0.006 8.29 -21.32 0.003 0.26 -0.006 6.679 -13.72 0.0049
**
 -1.00 
 (-1.49) (0.56) (-1.30) (1.14) (0.17) (-1.59) (0.43) (-0.88) (2.01) (-0.57) 
SIZE 0.0002 -0.98 -0.29 -0.00002 -0.24 -0.0002 -0.866 -1.11 -0.00002 -0.11 
 (0.30) (-0.40) (-0.14) (-0.08) (-1.17) (-0.26) (-0.38) (-0.63) (-0.09) (-0.60) 
SDUNEMP -0.0002 1.01 0.83 0.00006 -0.04 -0.0002 0.759 0.93 0.00003 -0.01 
 (-1.20) (1.14) (1.14) (0.53) (-0.64) (-1.13) (0.97) (1.39) (0.32) (-0.19) 
INCOME 0.0052 -1.14 -8.52 -0.001 -0.39 0.003 -0.938 -11.80
*
 -0.001 -0.51 
 (1.63) (-0.15) (-1.21) (-1.05) (-0.53) (1.30) (-0.14) (-1.81) (-0.85) (-0.76) 
FOREIGN -0.00001 -6.54 12.62 0.001 -0.03 -0.0005 -7.354 14.47 0.002 -0.33 
 (-0.01) (-0.65) (1.32) (1.11) (-0.05) (-0.23) (-0.75) (1.46) (1.50) (-0.39) 
LOAN -0.00‖ 13.81 12.17 -0.003 0.68 -0.001 12.55 12.99 -0.002* 0.68 
 (-0.79) (1.53) (1.43) (-1.52) (0.71) (-0.45) (1.49) (1.62) (-1.68) (0.78) 
EQUITY 0.03
***
 8.03 -42.47
*
 0.007 2.18 0.04
***
 9.290 -29.48 0.006 3.00 
 (3.38) (0.30) (-1.85) (1.32) (0.74) (4.53) (0.39) (-1.35) (1.22) (1.10) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.004
**
 -9.77 5.23 0.0003 -1.59
**
 -0.004
**
 -7.294 8.88 -0.0001 -0.79 
 (-2.27) (-1.30) (0.79) (0.32) (-2.30) (-2.49) (-1.07) (1.41) (-0.14) (-1.22) 
SINGLESTATE -0.00004 0.74 0.66 -0.0003
**
 0.15
*
 -0.0001 -0.0994 0.68 -0.0003
**
 0.17
*
 
 (-0.17) (0.88) (0.80) (-2.34) (1.85) (-0.59) (-0.12) (0.82) (-2.57) (1.96) 
SINGLECOUNTY -0.0004 -1.94 2.54 0.0003 -0.17 -0.0005 -1.509 0.37 0.0005
**
 -0.21 
 (-0.78) (-1.14) (1.24) (0.99) (-0.89) (-1.13) (-0.97) (0.20) (2.09) (-1.30) 
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1527 1233 1235 1506 1551 1695 1361 1360 1669 1719 
n 301 279 274 301 307 315 290 284 313 320 
R2 0.0793 0.0435 0.0399 0.0485 0.0409 0.0826 0.0312 0.0351 0.0502 0.0376 
K-P statistic 22.33 14.53 16.21 18.33 23.06 25.05 23.54 28.13 26.51 28.10 
J statistic 1.83 2.64 1.62 3.87 1.60 2.16 4.38 2.50 0.99 2.09 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z statistic 
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Very large banks (TA ≥ $10B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA LogZ 
GD 0.018 101.3 172.4 -0.015 9.98 -0.0006 78.47 22.88 -0.0107 9.252
**
 
 (0.25) (1.17) (1.33) (-0.79) (0.88) (-0.04) (1.36) (0.40) (-1.33) (1.99) 
GD² 0.0038 -78.87 -131.1 0.022 -10.46 0.006 -56.91 -19.12 0.00980 -7.806
**
 
 (0.07) (-1.17) (-1.32) (1.52) (-1.22) (0.42) (-1.11) (-0.40) (1.53) (-2.03) 
SIZE 0.0018 13.75
***
 14.40
***
 -0.001
*
 1.06
**
 0.001 7.98
**
 7.49
*
 -0.000919 0.889
**
 
 (1.24) (2.93) (3.19) (-1.80) (2.38) (0.92) (2.16) (1.81) (-1.34) (1.98) 
SDUNEMP 0.0002 1.18 2.99
**
 -0.0001 0.13 0.0002 1.54 2.46 0.0000220 -0.0240 
 (0.66) (1.22) (2.02) (-0.94) (1.46) (0.63) (1.21) (1.61) (0.12) (-0.23) 
INCOME 0.02 24.10 90.23 -0.009 7.49 0.01 62.42 66.19 -0.0108 9.629
**
 
 (1.36) (0.39) (1.34) (-1.07) (1.52) (1.33) (1.20) (1.21) (-1.33) (2.13) 
FOREIGN 0.01 -42.72 -30.50 0.02
***
 -8.25
**
 0.004 -27.15 -13.08 0.00752
*
 -2.076 
 (1.54) (-1.17) (-0.74) (3.82) (-2.23) (0.54) (-1.07) (-0.51) (1.69) (-0.77) 
LOAN -0.002 58.65
**
 70.51
**
 -0.009
*
 6.65
**
 -0.006 60.79
**
 31.78 -0.00962
**
 7.782
***
 
 (-0.24) (2.32) (2.16) (-1.77) (2.25) (-0.73) (2.44) (1.03) (-2.01) (3.03) 
EQUITY 0.01 -33.02 -197.5
**
 0.007 -3.46 0.04 15.87 -119.30 0.00954 -3.412 
 (0.45) (-0.49) (-1.96) (0.53) (-0.41) (1.50) (0.24) (-1.29) (0.76) (-0.46) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.0005 32.59 32.79 -0.009
**
 3.62 0.003 -3.94 14.97 -0.00343 2.862
*
 
 (-0.08) (1.13) (1.13) (-2.25) (1.51) (0.71) (-0.23) (0.68) (-1.04) (1.67) 
SINGLESTATE 0.002 11.24
***
 7.45
*
 -0.001
***
 1.02
***
 0.002
*
 13.71
**
 7.60 -0.00199
**
 1.398
***
 
 (0.80) (2.96) (1.83) (-2.90) (3.05) (1.82) (2.40) (1.63) (-2.53) (2.94) 
SINGLECOUNTY           
           
Other control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Bank Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 118 106 100 116 118 130 115 111 128 130 
n 23 22 22 23 23 23 22 22 23 23 
R2 0.324 0.383 0.363 0.425 0.398 0.354 0.334 0.344 0.407 0.395 
K-P statistic 6.54 6.20 5.22 6.13 6.36 22.35 14.02 18.03 21.22 22.34 
J statistic 4.30 7.99 6.37 4.66 7.88* 2.66 4.64 7.18* 0.89 0.29 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
0.24 
z statistic 1.92** 
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Table A7: Geographic diversification and bank risk (CRED_RISK) 
This table reports the IV regression results of our baseline model for the whole sample and across three sub-samples of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B < TA 
< $10B) and very large banks (TA ≥ $10B)) using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GD) from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). GD: measures of intrastate diversification or interstate diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.4. N: 
number of observations; n: number of banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic 
diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not significant. R2: R squared. K-P statistic: Kleinberger-Paap rk F statistic for 
weak instrument; J statistics: Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1.1. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 Whole sample Small banks Large Banks Very Large banks Whole sample Small banks Large Banks Very Large banks 
GD 0.004
***
 0.005
***
 -0.00009 -0.01 0.001 -0.0004 0.005 0.03 
 (3.27) (3.47) (-0.03) (-0.30) (0.67) (-0.12) (1.49) (1.58) 
GD² -0.003
*
 -0.004
**
 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.03
*
 
 (-1.94) (-2.22) (1.25) (0.17) (-0.46) (0.20) (-0.65) (-1.91) 
SIZE 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 -0.001 0.00009 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 
 (0.90) (1.49) (0.86) (-0.97) (0.66) (1.01) (1.44) (0.12) 
SDUNEMP 0.0001
***
 0.0001
***
 -0.000003 0.0006 0.0001
***
 0.0001
***
 -0.00004 -0.0002 
 (3.07) (3.14) (-0.02) (1.61) (2.94) (2.96) (-0.21) (-0.47) 
INCOME 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 0.005
**
 0.02 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 0.005
**
 0.03
**
 
 (3.41) (3.26) (2.10) (1.18) (3.63) (3.46) (2.00) (2.12) 
FOREIGN -0.004 -0.01 0.005
**
 0.01 -0.005 -0.01 0.004
**
 0.01 
 (-0.69) (-0.97) (2.50) (0.90) (-0.79) (-0.99) (2.24) (1.57) 
LOAN 0.0007 0.0007 0.008
***
 0.02
*
 0.0007 0.0008 0.007
***
 0.03
***
 
 (1.35) (1.36) (3.20) (1.94) (1.42) (1.45) (2.81) (3.10) 
EQUITY -0.01
***
 -0.009
***
 -0.008 0.01 -0.01
***
 -0.01
***
 -0.007 0.005 
 (-5.30) (-4.94) (-1.09) (0.57) (-5.69) (-5.44) (-0.98) (0.20) 
LIQUID_RISK 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 0.003 -0.005 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 0.002 -0.002 
 (3.16) (3.16) (1.44) (-0.58) (3.12) (3.00) (1.25) (-0.31) 
SINGLESTATE 0.00004 0.00002 -0.0002 0.002 0.00008 0.00001 -0.0001 0.003
**
 
 (0.39) (0.18) (-0.98) (1.30) (0.68) (0.09) (-0.57) (2.52) 
SINGLECOUNTY 0.0005
***
 0.0006
***
 0.0003  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005  
 (2.79) (2.88) (0.53)  (-1.40) (-1.57) (0.87)  
N 44468 42661 1616 118 44468 42661 1616 118 
n 5983 5719 317 23 5983 5719 317 23 
R2 0.0186 0.0172 0.125 0.549 0.0187 0.0174 0.122 0.567 
K-P statistic 342.66 321.64 23.49 3.54 306.05 150.91 28.92 21.35 
J statistic 2.80 3.05 1.76 6.76 2.77 1.18 3.74 1.46 
Marginal effect 0.003 0.004 
NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z statistic 3.73 3.87 
 
 
 
